DePaul Journal of Sports Law
Volume 16
Issue 1 Spring 2020

Article 4

Klawing for Protection: Kawhi Leonard's Battle with Nike over
Intellectual Property Rights
Gaetano Urgo

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gaetano Urgo, Klawing for Protection: Kawhi Leonard's Battle with Nike over Intellectual Property Rights,
16 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. (2020)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp/vol16/iss1/4

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Sports Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For
more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Klawing for Protection: Kawhi Leonard's Battle with Nike over Intellectual
Property Rights
Cover Page Footnote
Gaetano Urgo, J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2021; B.S. Philosophy and Political
Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017. Gaetano currently serves as a research staff
writer for the DePaul Sports Law Journal and will serve as the Editor-in-Chief during the 2020-21
academic year. Gaetano would like to sincerely thank his family for their support.

This notes and comments is available in DePaul Journal of Sports Law: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp/vol16/
iss1/4

54

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 16, Issue 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since entering the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) in 2011, Kawhi Leonard has
gradually become one of the best professional basketball players in the world. 1 After being
drafted by the San Antonio Spurs in 2011, Leonard quickly made a name for himself by
becoming one of the youngest players ever to win an NBA championship and be awarded the
Bill Russell NBA Finals Most Valuable Player (“MVP”) Award in 2014.2 Leonard also joined
the ranks of NBA legends by also winning the NBA’s Defensive Player of the Year Award.3
Most recently, in 2019, Leonard again earned himself a spot amongst elite NBA company by
winning the NBA championship with the Toronto Raptors and becoming only the third player in
league history to win the Finals MVP Award with two different teams.4
While accomplishing these many feats, Leonard has become popularly known by his
nickname, “The Klaw.” 5 Leonard has been referred to as “The Klaw” because of his incredible
skills on the defensive end of the court and his uniquely massive hands, which greatly aid his
defensive prowess. 6 This nickname has become so much a part of Leonard’s identity that it has
been incorporated into his personal logo, which he uses on all of his merchandise.7 Recently,
this logo has given rise to a lawsuit between Leonard and Nike, Inc. (“Nike”) over ownership of
the intellectual property. 8 The issue in this case stems from Leonard receiving a trademark
registration for the logo from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, while Nike had formally
secured copyright protection of the logo by registering it with the U.S. Copyright Office in
Washington D.C.9 The filing of this lawsuit raises many questions, the most pressing of which
being the determination of intellectual property ownership when opposing parties have
competing interests granted to them by the U.S. Copyright Office and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.
This lawsuit between Leonard and Nike, Inc. will be the focus of this Comment, which
will be broken up into four parts. Following this introduction in Part I, Part II will provide
background on current trademark and copyright law and the procedures that one must adhere to
in order to gain protection by either the U.S. Copyright Office or the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. Part II will also detail the right of publicity and explain what goes into making a right of
publicity claim. Further, Part II will lay the factual foundation for Leonard’s lawsuit against
1

Kawhi Leonard Biography Facts, Childhood, and Personal Life, Sporty Tell. (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://sportytell.com/basketball/kawhi-leonard-biography-facts-childhood-personal-life/
2
The NBA Finals MVP award was established in 1969 and is awarded to the best player on the winning team in the
NBA Finals. See NBA Awards: Finals MVP, Land of Basketball. (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://www.landofbasketball.com/awards/nba_finals_mvp_players.htm
3
The NBA Defensive Player of the Year Award is awarded to one player each year who proves to be the best
defensively. Kawhi Leonard became the third player in NBA history to win both NBA Defensive Player of the Year
Award and NBA Finals MVP. See Sporty Tell. (Nov. 27, 2019) https://sportytell.com/basketball/kawhi-leonardbiography-facts-childhood-personal-life/
4
Kawhi Leonard Joins Elite Company in Winning Finals MVP, NBA.com Staff. (Nov. 27, 2019).
https://www.nba.com/article/2019/06/13/finals-mvps-more-one-team
5
Sporty Tell. (Nov. 27, 2019) https://sportytell.com/basketball/kawhi-leonard-biography-facts-childhood-personallife/
6
Kawhi Leonard Nicknames: Meanings Behind “Qui” and “The Claw,” Heavy. (Nov. 27, 2019).
https://heavy.com/sports/2019/05/kawhi-leonard-nicknames-qui-claw-meanings/
7
Id.
8
Nike Countersues Kawhi in an Ongoing Battle Over The Klaw Logo, Sports Illustrated. (Nov. 27. 2019)
https://www.si.com/nba/2019/07/19/kawhi-leonard-clippers-nike-new-balance-klaw-logo
9
Id.
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Nike, as well as other NBA athletes’ intellectual property disputes. Specifically, it will examine
Shaquille O’Neal’s lawsuit over his likeness being used for “Shaqtus,” the Indianapolis Colts’
lawsuit for trademark infringement over the Baltimore CFL Colts name, and the Baltimore
Orioles’ lawsuit combatting the MLB’s Players Association’s right of publicity claim. Part III
will analyze current trademark and copyright law and discuss how Leonard’s lawsuit against
Nike, Inc. could have been resolved. Part III will also discuss a possible right of publicity claim
that Leonard could potentially have attempted to use to save his ownership interest.
Additionally, Part III will discuss how the judge ruled on Leonard’s case and explain his
remaining options. Finally, Part IV will discuss the possible impact that Leonard’s lawsuit will
have on athletes and intellectual property law at large, as well as discuss what changes should be
made to the system to alleviate future confusion.

II.

BACKGROUND

This section will provide an overview of the relevant copyright law and trademark law, as
well as the right of publicity. In addition, it will examine the factual circumstances surrounding
Kawhi Leonard’s lawsuit against Nike, Inc., as well as lawsuits involving other professional
athletes and organizations’ disputes over intellectual property.
A. Copyright Law
Copyright law originates from the U.S. Constitution Art. I § 8, representing the founding
fathers’ recognition of rights protecting authors and original expression.10 Since then, Congress
has codified the laws surrounding copyrights in Title 17 of the United States Code Service.11
Section 102 of Title 17 provides that, “copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”12 Works of authorship can include: writings,
music, videos, pictures, and a variety of other original works that are placed in a fixed tangible
medium.13 Copyright protection provides the owner with exclusive rights to reproduce the work,
distribute copies of the work, and publicly display the work.14 Copyrights further grant an author
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the original work.15
Copyrights are automatic, meaning that one obtains a copyright the second they put the
original work in tangible form.16 This means that one does not need to obtain formal registration

10

Corrie Lynn Rosen, Trademarks vs. Copyrights: Which one is right for you? (Nov. 27, 2019)
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/trademarks-vs-copyrights-which-one-is-right-for-you
11
17 U.S.C.S.
12
17 U.S.C.S. § 102
13
Id. a “fixed tangible medium” means the work must be established in some fixed form such as a book, print,
dramatic work, film, etc. Corrie Lynn Rosen, Trademarks vs. Copyrights: Which one is right for you? (Nov. 27,
2019) https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/trademarks-vs-copyrights-which-one-is-right-for-you
14
17 U.S.C.S. § 106(1)-(6).
15
Id.; A Derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting works. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101.
16
Rick Meisher, Kawhi Leonard v. Nike, Inc.: How copyrights can trump trademarks? (Nov. 27, 2019)
https://www.technologylawsource.com/2019/06/articles/intellectual-property-1/copyright/kawhi-leonard-v-nike-inchow-copyrights-can-trump-trademarks/; A work is fixed in a “tangible form” when its embodiment, by or under the
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of a copyright within the United States Copyright Office in order to have their original work
protected. If one wishes to obtain formal registration, an application must be sent to the United
States Copyright Office for approval.17 In the application, a person seeking formal registration
must include: copies of the work, their name and address, a title for the work, and the year in
which creation was completed.18 If the claimant is not the author, they must submit a statement
explaining how they received ownership of the work.19 If the work was a “work made for hire,”
then the claimant must also submit a statement indicating such.20
If, after reviewing the applicant’s submissions, the U.S. Copyright Office determines that
the material submitted constitutes a work that is copyrightable, the office will register the work
and issue the applicant a certificate of registration.21 While a copyright exists the second an
author places the work in a fixed tangible medium, formally registering the work provides
multiple benefits including: a public record of ownership, a presumption of ownership, quicker
access to the courts for handling of disputes, and eligibility for statutory damages, attorney fees,
and costs of suit.22
Congress has spelled out multiple ways in which people can come into ownership of a
copyright. Initial ownership of a copyright is given to the author or authors at the time the work
is created.23 If two or more people collaborate to make a joint work, they are deemed to be coowners of the copyright in the work.24 When dealing with “works made for hire,” unless the
parties have expressly agreed to something different in writing, the employer is considered the
owner of the work and the copyrights.25 Thus, while ownership of copyrights typically vests in
the original author of the work, it is possible for someone to gain ownership of a copyright for a
work they did not create. Ownership of a copyright may be transferred to someone else by
means of a conveyance or by the creation of a right by existing legal principles, otherwise known
as “operation of law.”26 Aside from operation of law, no transfer of a copyright will be held as
valid unless it is expressly spelled out in writing.27 This means that it is possible for someone to
“sign away” their rights to ownership of a copyright by way of a contract.
A copyright has a predetermined life span. Typically, a copyright lasts for the entire life
of the author, plus seventy years after the author’s death.28 A copyright in a “work made for
authority of its author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101.
17
17 U.S.C.S. § 408.
18
17 U.S.C.S. § 409(1), § 409(6), and § 409(7).
19
Id. at § 409(5).
20
Id. at § 409(4); A “work made for hire” is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101.
21
Id. at § 410(a).
22
Aaron K. Haar and Maria Cremi Speth, Why Register My Copyrights? The Benefits of Copyright Registration.
(Nov. 27, 2019). http://www.jaburgwilk.com/news-publications/benefits-of-copyright-registration
23
17 U.S.C.S. § 201(a).
24
Id.
25
17 U.S.C.S. § 201(b).
26
17 U.S.C.S. § 201(d)(1); An example of operation of law is a child inheriting property from his deceased parent
who does not have a will by virtue of the intestate succession laws of the state. Mary Randolph, Nolo, How an
Estate Is Settled if There’s No Will: Intestate Succession. (May 7, 2020). https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/how-estate-settled-if-theres-32442.html
27
17 U.S.C.S. § 204(a).
28
17 U.S.C.S. § 302(a).
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hire,” however, will expire at the earlier of ninety-five years from the date of publication or 120
years from the date of creation.29
There are a variety of remedies that can be granted by the courts when infringement is
found. First, a court may order an injunction preventing the infringing party from using the
copyrighted work.31 A court could also order the destruction of all copies that infringe on the
author’s copyright.32 An infringer may also be liable for damages, including the profits made in
violation of the author’s copyright.33
30

B. Trademark Law
A trademark protects names, terms, and symbols that identify and differentiate specific
companies and their goods.34 Just as a logo is copyrightable, it is also capable of obtaining
trademark protection because logos are often used by consumers to distinguish one company’s
product from another’s.35 Take, for example, pairs of shoes similar in style that are the products
of two popular, but distinct companies: Nike and Adidas. Consumers looking to purchase Nike
shoes will typically rely on Nike’s logo to determine if they are buying the right pair. Nike’s
logo, the “Nike Swoosh,” is an internationally recognizable logo that allows consumers to
identify Nike brand products. Because logos are relied on by consumers in this manner, courts
have determined that logos can receive trademark protection.36
While someone does not need to register their trademark to have protection over it,
registering it with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will afford the owner more protection
against improper use of the mark in commerce.37 In order to register a trademark, an applicant
must fill out an application and file it with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.38 Similar to an
application for a copyright, a trademark application must include information about the
applicant’s domicile and citizenship, as well as the date of the mark’s first use, the date of the
mark’s first use in commerce, and a depiction of the mark.39 An applicant must also verify that

29
17 U.S.C.S. § 302(c). A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; where a
work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the
work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate
work. “Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes
of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes a “publication.” 17 U.S.C.S. § 101.
30
Infringement is very similar to stealing. Infringement occurs anytime you are copying someone else’s original
work without permission. Examples of copyright infringement include but are not limited to: downloading movies
or music without proper payment for use, recording movies in a theater, and using others’ photographs in a blog
without permission. Mary Juetten, How to Avoid Copyright Infringement (May 5, 2020).
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/how-to-avoid-copyright-infringement
31
17 U.S.C.S. § 502(a).
32
17 U.S.C.S. § 503.
33
17 U.S.C.S. § 504(a).
34
Trademark vs Copyright: Everything You Need to Know, UpCounsel. (Nov. 30, 2019).
https://www.upcounsel.com/trademark-vs-copyright
35
Id.
36
15 U.S.C.S. § 1052(d).
37
Id.
38
15 U.S.C.S. § 1051(a)(1).
39
15 U.S.C.S. § 1051(a)(2). “A mark shall be deemed to be in ‘use in commerce’ on goods when (1) it is placed in
any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays [their] associated [with] or on the tags or labels affixed,
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the facts asserted in the application are all true.40 Included in this are the facts that the applicant
is the rightful owner of the mark and that the mark is in use in commerce.41 Another very
important fact that must be verified by the applicant is that, to the best of the applicant’s
knowledge, no other person has the right to use the mark in commerce. An applicant must also
verify that no other person has the right to use a mark so similar to the applicant’s, that when
used it will cause confusion, mistake, or deceit over who owns the marks.42
A trademark will not be registered if it may falsely represent a connection with a
person.43 Further, a mark will not be registered if it will cause confusion, mistake, or deception
as to who really owns it when used in connection with the applicant’s goods.44 In order to ensure
that the mark in question is in compliance with all of these requirements, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office uses an “examiner” to look into the mark and determine if the applicant is the
rightful person to register it.45 A registered trademark will last 10 years after being filed and
must be renewed every 10 years for the owner to retain registered protection.46 This means a
trademark can last forever as long as it is continuously renewed.
An important entity within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board consists of the Director of the U.S
Patent and Trademark Office, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the
Commissioner for Trademarks, and an administrative trademark judge appointed by the
Secretary of Commerce and Director.47 All cases involving the rights and registration of
trademarks can be brought before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.48 For instance, if an
examiner determines that the applicant is not the rightful person to register the mark, the
applicant may appeal that decision to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.49 If dissatisfied
with the decision of the Director or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, an applicant can appeal
issues even further to a United States Court of Appeals.50
There are multiple remedies that can be offered when a trademark is infringed upon.51 A
trademark owner who believes its mark is being infringed upon may file a lawsuit in either state
or federal court for trademark infringement.52 First, in order to be able to recover for
infringement, a registrant must provide notice that the mark is registered.53 This is done by
or….on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (2) the goods are sold or transported in commerce.”
“Commerce” means all commerce which may be lawfully regulated by Congress. 15 U.S.C.S § 1127
40
15 U.S.C.S. § 1051(a)(3).
41
Id. at § 1051(a)(3)(A)-(C).
42
Id. at § 1051(a)(3)(D).
43
15 U.S.C.S. § 1052(a).
44
Id. at § 1052(d).
45
15 U.S.C.S. § 1062.
46
15 U.S.C.S. § 1058
47
15 U.S.C.S. § 1067
48
Id.
49
15 U.S.C.S. § 1070.
50
15 U.S.C.S. § 1071.
51
A trademark is infringed upon by the unauthorized use of the trademark in connection with goods or services in a
manner that is likely to cause confusion, deception, or mistake about the source of the goods and/or services. United
States Patent and Trademark Office, About Trademark Infringement, (May 7, 2020).
https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademark-infringement
52
Id.
53
15 U.S.C.S. § 1111.
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explicitly saying so or placing the certified registered mark “®” “R” enclosed within a circle next
to the mark.54 Any person who uses a registered mark in commerce without the consent of the
registrant will be subject to civil damages.55 It must be shown that the acts have been committed
with knowledge that the use of the mark is intended to cause confusion, mistake, or deception.56
A court may grant injunctions to prevent any violations of a registrant's rights over a
mark. When counterfeit marks used in the sale or distribution of goods are at issue, a court
may grant an order for the seizure of such goods and marks involved in the violation.58 When a
violation is found, the registrant will be entitled to damages, including profits earned by the
defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s trademark, damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of the violation, and the costs of the action.59 The court has discretion in determining what
damages are to be awarded.60 In the case of the intentional use of a counterfeit mark, the court
may enter an order for three times the amount of profits or damages, whichever is greater.61 A
court may also order that all products in possession of the violator containing the registered mark
be destroyed.62
57

In all actions involving a registered mark, courts may determine the rights to a
registration.63 This means that the courts could determine who owns a registered mark, if the
registration of a mark should be cancelled, or if the registration of a mark should be restored.64
Normally, registration of a mark by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office can be used as
evidence of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.65 This will not be
conclusive proof, however.66 If it is determined that a mark has been registered in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office through fraud or deceit, the registrant responsible for the fraud or
deceit will be liable to any person who was harmed for any damages suffered.67
The owner of a mark which becomes so famous or distinctive, either inherently or over
time, may be entitled to an injunction against a person who uses a mark in commerce that is
likely to cause dilution of the mark, regardless of whether or not there is actual confusion,
competition, or economic injury.68 A mark is considered “famous” if it is widely recognized by
the consumers of the U.S. as a source of the goods or services offered by the mark’s owner.69
“Dilution by blurring” occurs by the similarity between a mark and a famous mark that impairs
54

Id.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1114(1).
56
Id.
57
15 U.S.C.S. § 1116(a).
58
Id. at § 1116(D)(1)(A). A “Counterfeit Mark” is defined as “a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the
principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for sale,
or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so
registered.” Id. at § 1116(D)(1)(B)(i).
59
15 U.S.C.S. § 1117(a).
60
Id.
61
Id. at § 1117(b).
62
15 U.S.C.S. § 1118.
63
15 U.S.C.S. § 1119.
64
Id.
65
15 U.S.C.S. § 1115(a).
66
Id.
67
15 U.S.C.S. § 1120.
68
15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c)(1).
69
Id. at 1125(c)(2)(A).
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the distinctiveness of the famous mark.70 Courts will look to multiple factors when determining
dilution of a mark, including the degree of similarity between the mark and the famous mark, the
degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark, the extent to which the owner
of the famous mark is engaged in the exclusive use of the mark, the degree of recognition of the
mark, and any actual association between the mark and the famous mark.71 Trademark dilution
involves a mark that is in connection with goods or services that do not compete with those in
connection to the famous mark.72 For example, trademark dilution laws may prevent a
harmonica maker from using the name “Ferrari,” even though no one would confuse the
harmonicas for the cars.73
C. Right of Publicity
The right of publicity relates to a legally-recognizable right in a celebrity’s identity
value.74 The right of publicity, like a copyright, protects a form of intellectual property that
society deems to have some social utility.75 The right of publicity was first recognized in 1953
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a case involving exclusive rights to a baseball
player’s photograph used on trading cards.76 There, the Court held that the right of publicity was
a property right that was assignable and licensable like any other intellectual property right.77
Legal protections for the right of publicity exist under two broad areas: (1) common law
protections, based on theories including privacy torts or the tort of misappropriation of name and
likeness; and (2) statutory protections, with some state statutes addressing celebrity rights in
considerable detail.78 There is no federal protection for the right of publicity; it is a right that
exists at state level, either through statutes or common law.79
The right of publicity is based on the tort of misappropriation and is related to a property
right to name and likeness used for commercial purposes without consent.80 The right of
publicity protects an individual’s name, image, signature, voice, likeness, and persona used for
commercial purposes and advertising.81 It has been interpreted to include things, such as
distinctive speaking or singing voices, nicknames, and other images or suggestions that may be
enough to evoke a famous personality without actually showing his or her likeness.82 Like any
other property right, the right of publicity can be licensed, assigned; and in some states, it can
even last after a celebrity’s death and pass to heirs and legatees.83 This right exists separately
70

Id. at 1125(c)(2)(B)
Id. at 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi).
72
Fact Sheets: Protecting a Trademark: Trademark Dilution. (January 25, 2020)
https://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/Trademark-Dilution-(Intended-for-a-non-legalaudience).aspx.
73
Id.
74
Corey Field, Entertainment Law: Fundamentals and Practice, 284 (1st ed. 2018) (citing Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 299 (2001)).
75
Id.
76
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, (2d Cir. 1953).
77
Id. at 868
78
Corey Field, Entertainment Law: Fundamentals and Practice, 285 (1st ed. 2018).
79
Id. at 285 n.12
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
71
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from rights that arise under trademark and copyright laws.84 The right of publicity can be
invoked with other causes of action related to intellectual property rights. For example, when a
celebrity enforces his right of publicity under state law, he or she may also bring other causes of
action under both state and federal laws, such as false endorsement under the Lanham Act,
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, misappropriation under state law, unfair
competition under state law and under the Lanham Act, and various forms of actions under state
law rights of privacy, most notably “false light” claims.85
The leading jurisdictions in this area of intellectual property rights are entertainment
focused jurisdictions, including California and New York.86 Consequently, this Comment will
examine the right of publicity in California. Later, when addressing whether or not Leonard’s
right of publicity is preempted by copyright law, this Comment will briefly examine Oregon’s
right of publicity law, as that is where the lawsuit at issue has been moved to. California’s right
of publicity statute requires that someone “knowingly use another’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for the
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or
services, without such person’s prior consent.”87 Damages under the statute are broadly defined
as actual damages, profits of the infringer less deductible expenses, and punitive damages.88 In
addition to this, the award of attorneys’ fees and costs for the prevailing party are also included.89
The person depicted must be actually identifiable in the infringing use for a right of publicity
claim to prevail.90 “A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a photograph when
one who views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine that the person
depicted in the photograph is the same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.”91
One example of the “identifiable” standard can be found in the 1998 Ninth Circuit case,
Newcombe v. Coors. There, the Court held that a drawing of a baseball pitcher was sufficiently
identifiable as the plaintiff because of his well-known pitching stance, despite the fact that it did
not show his face.92 Based on this holding, it is clear that an image, such as a logo that depicts a
well-known characteristic of a celebrity, can trigger a right of publicity claim.
D. Right of Publicity and Related Causes of Action
As stated earlier, the right of publicity can be raised along with other federal causes of
actions relating to intellectual property. These causes of action derive from both trademark and
copyright laws. One common federal cause of action raised with the right of publicity is false
endorsement under the Lanham Act.93 False endorsement occurs when a celebrity’s identity, his
or her “mark,” is connected with a product or service in such a way that consumers are likely to

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a).
88
Corey Field, Entertainment Law: Fundamentals and Practice, 289 (1st ed. 2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Code §
3344(a)).
89
Id. (citing Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 50 (2006)).
90
Id.
91
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(c).
92
Corey Field, Entertainment Law: Fundamentals and Practice, 290 (1st ed. 2018) (citing Newcombe v. Coors, 157
F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998)).
93
Id. at 294.
85
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be misled about the celebrity’s sponsorship or approval of the product or service.94 In false
endorsement claims, the “mark” is the plaintiff’s identity.95 Courts consider consumer confusion
to occur when consumers believe that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated
in some way, or when consumers make an incorrect mental association between the involved
commercial products or their producers on the one hand and the celebrity on the other.96 Despite
there being no federal cause of action for the right of publicity, a plaintiff may still get into
federal court by raising the claim along with one of these related causes of action.
E. Copyright Preemption of the Right of Publicity
Under the Copyright Act, state law claims are preempted by federal copyright law.97
Many right of publicity disputes involve copyrighted works, therefore courts often have to
undergo a preliminary analysis to determine whether or not the right of publicity claim is
preempted by federal copyright law.98 The Ninth Circuit has developed a two-part test, which is
now widely adopted among the Circuits, to determine whether a state law claim such as a right of
publicity claim is preempted by the Copyright Act.99 The Court first must determine whether the
subject matter of the state law claim is in fact a copyright and covered under the Copyright
Act.100 The Court must then determine whether the rights asserted under the state law are
equivalent to the exclusive rights of a copyright holder under the Copyright Act.101 This means
that for a right of publicity claim to survive copyright preemption, there has to be some “extra
elements” of a right of publicity claim that would make it different from a copyright
infringement claim.102
An example of copyright preemption of a right of publicity claim can be found in a
Seventh Circuit lawsuit between the Baltimore Orioles and the Major League Baseball (MLB)
Players Association.103 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. involves the longstanding dispute between
professional baseball clubs and players over the ownership of broadcast rights of games.104 The
clubs argued that the telecasts of games constituted copyrighted “works-made-for-hire,” which
the baseball players had no rights in.105 The Court examined the telecasts of the games, and held
that they were works-made-for-hire because: (1) the telecasts were fixed in a tangible form; (2)
the telecasts were original works of authorship; and (3) the telecasts came within the subject
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matter of copyrights.106 The Court held that since the players were employees of their respective
professional clubs and their performances were within the scope of their employment with the
clubs, the telecasts were works-made-for-hire, which the professional clubs had exclusive
ownership over.107
The players claimed that, while the professional clubs owned the copyrights in the
telecasts of games, the broadcast of those telecasts without the players’ express consent violated
the rights to publicity in their performances.108 The Court looked at two conditions that must be
satisfied for preemption of a right under state law: (1) the work in which the right is asserted
must be fixed in a tangible form and come within the subject matter of copyrights, and (2) the
right must be equivalent to any of the rights specified in section 106 of the Copyright Act.109
Since the Court had already held that the telecasts were copyrights owned by the owners, prong
one was easily met. The Court said, “as long as a work fits within one of the general subject
matter categories of section 102 and 103 [of the Copyright Act], [section 301(a)] prevents the
States from protecting it.”110
Next the Court looked to whether the second prong for preemption was met, meaning:
whether rights were equivalent to a right within the general scope of copyright law or if there
were any extra elements.111 “A right is ‘equivalent’ to one of the rights within the general scope
of copyright law if it is violated by the exercise of the rights set forth in section 106 [of the
Copyright Act].”112 Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants the owner of the copyright the
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display the copyrighted work.113 This means
that a right is equivalent to one of the rights comprised by a copyright if it is infringed by the
mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display.114 The Court held that since the
right of publicity in their performances was equivalent to the rights encompassed by copyright
law, the players’ rights of publicity in their performances were preempted.115
F. NBA Athletes and Intellectual Property
While the lawsuit between Kawhi Leonard and Nike, Inc. is unique in that it involved
competing intellectual property protections, the courts are no strangers to the issues that
professional athletes face when it comes to their intellectual property. There have been several
occasions where NBA athletes formally disputed intellectual property rights. It is only fitting
that one of the most prominent disputes over intellectual property involving an NBA athlete
comes from one of the most dominant players the league has ever seen.116 This lawsuit, brought
by Shaquille O’Neal over the “Shaqtus,” highlights a key argument available to athletes in
intellectual disputes – the likelihood of consumer confusion.
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1. Shaq and the “Shaqtus”

Shaquille O’Neal is a prominent former NBA player who obtained many trademarks in
his name, image, and likeness to protect the word “Shaq” and other Shaq-formative marks.117
Michael Calmese, owner and registered agent of an Arizona company called True Logo Fan,
Inc., had created a character called the “Shaqtus,” which depicted a cactus with a man’s facial
expression, wearing an orange basketball jersey with O’Neal’s number (#32), and bouncing a
basketball.118 After discovering this “Shaqtus”character, O’Neal sued, bringing six different
claims, including trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution.119 To
prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a party must establish: (1) that it has a protectable
ownership interest in the mark, and (2) that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause
consumer confusion.120 The Court considered eight factors to determine whether consumer
confusion is likely to occur: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of
the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of good and
the degree of care likely to be used by the consumer; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark;
and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.121
First the Court determined that the Shaq mark was both conceptually and commercially
strong, and therefore this factor should weigh in favor of likelihood of confusion.122 It was
conceptually strong because it was a coined term that did not exist in the English language.123 It
was commercially strong because it had been used nationwide since the 1990’s to refer to
O’Neal and the goods or services that originate from him and his company.124
The next factor the Court looked to was the “proximity of the goods,” which meant the
relatedness of the goods at issue.125 The danger of related goods causing confusion is high
because the public will likely look at related goods and mistakenly assume that they come from
the same producer.126 Both goods were T-shirts: O’Neal sold T-shirts with the “Shaq” mark
while Calamese sold T-shirts with the “Shaqtus” mark.127 The Court determined that since the
products are identical in use and function, the factor should weigh in favor of likelihood of
confusion.128
Next the Court looked at similarity between the marks. “The greater the similarity
between the marks at issue, the greater the likelihood of confusion.”129 The marks do not have to
be exactly alike to be considered similar, notably.130 Typically, courts look to three factors to
determine similarity between marks: sight, sound, and meaning.131 The Court again determined
117

Mine O’Mine Inc., v. Calmese, 2011 U.S. Dist. 75236 (D.C. Nev. 2011).
Id. at 3.
119
Id. at 5.
120
Id. at 11. (quoting Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006).
121
Id. at 13.
122
Id. at 15.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 16.
126
Id. at 16 (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
127
Id. at 17.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 17 (quoting GoTo.com Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2007).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 17 (quoting Sleekcraft, 599. F.2d at 351).
118

65

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 16, Issue 1

that this factor should weigh in favor of confusion because the two marks were similar in sight,
sound, and meaning.132 The Court reasoned that they were similar in sight and sound because
both marks began with the same four letters.133 Further, because both “Shaq” and “Shaqtus”
have been used to refer to O’Neal, the marks had a similar meaning as well.134
The Court did not consider actual confusion because it lacked the necessary facts, and
when it turned to the marketing channels used by both producers, the court determined that the
factor was not of great significance.135 When looking to the type of goods and degree of care to
be exercised by the consumer, the Court looked at how expensive the product was because
consumers exercise more care in their purchasing decisions when buying expensive products.136
T-shirts are inexpensive, so the Court determined that consumers would exercise little care when
deciding to purchase them, which therefore would lead to consumer confusion.137
The Court next looked to the intent of the defendant in selecting the mark.138 The courts
presume an intent to deceive the public when an infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to
another’s.139 The Court ruled that Calmese clearly intended to confuse the public because he had
known of the “Shaq” mark’s existence and purposely created “Shaqtus” after O’Neal was traded
to the Phoenix Suns and called “Shaqtus.”140 Fans and media alike referred to O’Neal as the
“Shaqtus” connecting him to a cactus commonly found in Ariona, thus making confusion of the
public easy to find.
While the Court determined that the eighth factor, “likelihood of expansion of product
lines” was low, it determined that overall there was a high likelihood of consumer confusion.141
Subsequently, the Court ruled in favor of Shaq on his trademark infringement claims.142
G. Kawhi Leonard v. Nike, Inc.
In June of 2019, Kawhi Leonard first filed suit against Nike, Inc. over the rights to the
“Klaw” logo.143 According to the Complaint, in 2011, Kawhi had authored a distinctive logo
that included elements unique and meaningful to him, including a sketch of his large hands, as
well as his initials “K.L.” and his basketball number.144 On October 26, 2011, Leonard entered
into a contract agreement (“Nike Agreement”), which was for Leonard to provide “personal
services and expertise in the sport of professional basketball and endorsement of the Nike brand
and use of Nike products.”145 Nike had reached out to Leonard about making a unique logo for
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him, but Leonard had rejected all of Nike’s proposals.146 Leonard had forwarded the logo that he
had created back in 2011, and permitted Nike to use it during the term of the Nike Agreement as
long as it was under his supervision and control.147 After much back and forth, Nike finally
created a logo proposal, based off of Leonard’s original work, one that he approved of and
allowed Nike to place on all merchandise during the term of the Nike Agreement.148
Leonard alleged that he had never transferred his rights to the logo to Nike at any time,
and that Nike representatives had confirmed his ownership of the logo by frequently referring to
it as “Kawhi’s logo” and allowing Leonard to use the logo on non-Nike merchandise.149 Without
Leonard’s knowledge or consent, Nike had filed for and obtained a registered copyright in the
“Kawhi Leonard Logo.”150 After finding out about the copyright that Leonard believed Nike
registered under false misrepresentations, Leonard obtained registered trademarks in his logo on
November 9, 2017.151 Leonard had planned on using this logo for commercial purposes by
affixing it on his merchandise and using it in connection with his charities and sports camps.152
On December 21, 2018, John Matterazzo, Nike’s VP and Global Counsel for Sports Marketing,
had written to Leonard informing him of Nike’s ownership in the logo pursuant to the Nike
Agreement and demanded that Leonard stop using the logo.153 On January 30, 2019, Leonard
responded to Nike, asking that Nike rescind its copyrights while informing the company that he
owned trademarks protecting his ownership in the logo and that he was going to continue using
the logo on his merchandise.154
On March 11, 2019, Nike sent a final response to Leonard, ordering him to cease and
desist his use in the logo, stating it owned all intellectual property rights in the logo.155 After
receiving Leonard’s complaint, Nike responded with affirmative defenses and counterclaims of
its own.156 Nike’s second affirmative defense attacked Leonard’s ownership of the logo.157 Nike
claimed that in the Nike Agreement, Leonard expressly acknowledged that Nike exclusively
owns all interests in all intellectual property that is created by either Nike or Leonard in
connection with the Nike Agreement.158 Nike further alleged that it is the exclusive owner of the
“Klaw Design” because the design was developed by Nike’s designers on a “work for hire”
basis.159
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In its counterclaims, Nike alleged that Leonard was attempting to “rewrite history” by
asserting that he designed the “Klaw Design.”160 Nike claimed that Leonard himself
acknowledged Nike’s design of the logo in an interview where he was quoted as saying, “I drew
up the rough draft, sent it over, and they (Jordan Brand) made it perfect … I give the Jordan
Brand team all of the credit because I am no artist at all … they refined it and made it look better
than I thought it would ever be and I am extremely happy with the final version.”161 Nike further
argues that Leonard was trying to pass off his original rough draft of his logo and Nike’s final
version of the logo as the same product, when they are clearly distinct works.162
Additionally, Nike alleged that Leonard had improperly filed a U.S. Federal Trademark
application for the use of the “Klaw Design” and fraudulently claimed to be the sole owner of the
“Klaw Design” when applying for a registered copyright in the logo.163 In light of these
allegations, Nike requested that the court: (1) enter a judgment declaring that Nike is the
exclusive owner of the “Klaw Design; (2) enter a judgment against Leonard for infringing on
Nike’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act to reproduce and distribute the “Klaw Design;”
(3) enter a judgment against Leonard for committing fraud on the Copyright Office when
applying for his registration; (4) enter a judgment against Leonard for breach of contract; (5)
grant a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Leonard from continuing to infringe on
Nike’s exclusive rights in the Klaw Design; and (6) enter a judgment for an award of monetary
damages suffered by Nike as a result of Leonard’s alleged infringement/breach of contract.164
In Leonard’s complaint he sought a declaratory judgment that he was the sole owner of
the logo, and that Nike committed fraud when registering the logo with the Copyright Office.
On October 3rd, 2019, the court transferred this case out of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California to the District of Oregon, pursuant to a forum selection clause in
the endorsement contract.165

III. ANALYSIS
This section will analyze Leonard’s lawsuit, lay out the possible outcomes that could
have come from this litigation, and then compare it with how the Court ruled. To do this, it will
be important to first look at the logo from a copyright standpoint. Then, after determining who
should have copyrights in the logo, it will be necessary to examine the Nike Agreement’s
intellectual property ownership provision that Leonard agreed to in his endorsement deal.
Separately, a brief glance at the right of publicity will be necessary to determine whether a
possible right of publicity claim by Leonard would have been preempted by copyright law. It
will then be important to examine trademark law for possible recourse that may have been
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available to Leonard. After summarizing the realm of possibilities, this Comment will turn to the
ruling by the Court and assess where each party stands after litigation.
A. Copyrights in the “Klaw Logo”
At first glance, it is clear that Leonard has copyrights in the original logo that he first
created and forwarded over to Nike.166 The original logo is not what is at issue here, however.
The logo in question is the final version of Leonard’s original logo that was modified by Nike.
Ownership of the copyrights in this modified logo will depend on exactly how drastically
modified the final logo is from Leonard’s original.167 The Court could have viewed the
modifications to Leoanrd’s original logo in three possible ways: (1) the modifications are not
great enough to constitute an original work of authorship; (2) the logo is modified enough to
represent an original work as a derivative work; or (3) the modifications are so great that the new
logo is an entirely original work of authorship.168 Had the Court found that the logo was not
modified enough to be considered an original work, then Leonard would be granted copyrights in
both logos. If, however, the Court determined that the modifications were great enough to
conclude that the new logo is an original derivative work from Leonard’s original logo, then
Nike would have rights to the new logo.169 Similarly, if it was determined that the modifications
constituted a brand new original work, Nike would be granted ownership of the new logo.170
B. The Contractual Language
While the three above scenarios each provide an answer to who has ownership of the
copyright, the inquiry does not end there, as it is possible for someone to transfer the ownership
of their copyrights through a contract.171 Therefore, a closer look at the intellectual property and
ownership provision that Leonard agreed to in the Nike Agreement was necessary to determine
where ownership should lie. According to Nike’s Answer, Leonard agreed to “Nike Standard
Terms and Conditions,” which acknowledges Nike’s exclusive rights in intellectual property
created pursuant to the Nike Agreement.172 Paragraph eight of those Standard Terms and
Conditions states:
“OWNERSHIP OF NIKE MARKS, DESIGNS & CREATIVES.
CONSULTANT (a) acknowledges that NIKE exclusively owns all
rights, title and interest in and to the NIKE Marks and that NIKE
shall exclusively own all rights, title and interest in and to any
logos, trademarks, service marks, characters, personas, copyrights,
shoe or other product designs, patents, trade secrets or other forms
of intellectual property created by NIKE (and/or its agents),
CONSULTANT or ATHLETE in connection with this Contract;
(b) shall completely cooperate with NIKE in its efforts to obtain
166
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and maintain protection for such right, title and interest, including
by promptly executing any documents as maybe required by NIKE
in connection therewith; and (c) further acknowledges that after
expiration or termination of this Contract, NIKE shall continue to
have the unrestricted right to use (and without any
CONSULTANT or ATHLETE approval) such intellectual
property, including without limitation the right to re-issue a
"signature" product previously associated with ATHLETE,
provided that such post-contractual use shall not then include the
ATHLETE Endorsement.”173

Parsing the exact language of the contract, it seems as though all rights in the newly –
modified “Klaw Logo” should belong to Nike. A copyright is often described as a bundle of
exclusive rights, each of which may be freely transferred.174 Among these exclusive rights are
rights of reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, public performance and
public display.175 The legal owner of these rights may transfer ownership through the use of an
exclusive license.176 After reading the contract language quoted above, it seems as though
Leonard agreed to transfer his rights through an exclusive license via contract. As a result, Nike
should retain all copyrights in the logo pursuant to this provision because the modifications were
made to the logo during the term of and in connection with the contract.
C. Leonard’s Right of Publicity
An argument exists that Leonard’s logo plausibly meets all the necessary requirements
for a right of publicity claim. As stated earlier, the right of publicity protects an individual’s
name, image, signature, voice, likeness, and persona used for commercial purposes and
advertising.177 Leonard’s logo contains such distinct characteristics that are purely contributable
to himself and his fame (his initials, basketball number, markedly giant hand), that it is very
likely that a court would hold it to be sufficiently identifiable to trigger a right of publicity
claim.178 If his logo was used on other products without his consent, Leonard would be able to
recoup actual damages, profits Nike made off of the logo’s use, and perhaps even punitive
damages.179 In order to determine whether or not a right of publicity claim is preempted by
copyright law, one must look to the state’s right of publicity statute for any extra elements that
are not encompassed by copyright law.180 This lawsuit was originally taking place in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, before it was transferred to the U.S District
Court of Oregon pursuant to a forum selection clause in Leonard’s endorsement contract with
Nike.181 This means that when looking at the right of publicity, one must look to Oregon state
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law to determine whether or not a possible right of publicity claim is preempted by copyright
law.182 This change in venue is fatal to any right of publicity claim that Leonard could make, as
Oregon does not recognize the right of publicity at all.183 It is not known if Nike purposely
chooses Oregon as its principal place of business in order to protect itself from right of publicity
claims, but it is an effective strategy for a company that almost exclusively works with
professional athletes. Had this case stayed in California, it is likely that Kawhi Leonard’s right
of publicity claim would not have been preempted by copyright law, as he would be contesting
the use of his name and likeness in a commercial setting.184
D. Recourse in Trademark Law
While it seems as though Leonard is caught in a losing battle, there may still be recourse
in trademark law. Leonard could potentially counter by alleging dilution of his mark.185 To
support his claim, Leonard can cite Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd, an
analysis of which will prove beneficial to this argument.186 In that case, National Football
League (“NFL”) franchise, the Indianapolis Colts, sued the Canadian Football League’s
(“CFL”) “Baltimore CFL Colts” for trademark infringement.187 Prior to moving to Indianapolis,
the Colts were located in Baltimore and known as the “Baltimore Colts.”188 The Baltimore Colts
organization was one of the most well-known franchises in NFL history.189 Nine years after the
Baltimore Colts moved to Indianapolis and changed their name to the Indianapolis Colts, the
CFL granted Baltimore a franchise which they named “Baltimore Colts.”190 Both the NFL and
Indianapolis Colts sought an injunction preventing the new team from using the name “Colts,”
“Baltimore Colts,” and “Baltimore CFL Colts” in connection with the playing of professional
football, the broadcast of football games, and the sale of merchandise to football fans and other
buyers.191
The Court set out to determine whether or not “Baltimore CFL Colts” was confusingly
similar to the “Indianapolis Colts,” by virtue of the history of the Indianapolis Colts and the
overlapping product and geographical markets served by both the Indianapolis and Baltimore
CFL Colts.192 First, the Court looked to whether or not confusion was possible between the two
marks.193 The Court held that confusion was possible because consumers who do not regularly
watch football could turn on a Baltimore CFL Colts game thinking they are watching an
“original” Baltimore Colts game.194 Consumers could also buy Baltimore CFL Colts
182
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merchandise and reasonably think they are buying “original” Baltimore Colts merchandise, per
the Court.195 This would take away revenue from both the NFL and Indianapolis Colts and thus
result in a trademark infringement, the judge explained.
After determining that it was possible for confusion to arise amongst consumers, the
Court then looked to whether or not confusion was likely.196 The Court noted that the legal
standard under the Lanham Act is “whether it is likely that the challenged mark, if permitted to
be used by the defendant, would cause the plaintiff to lose a substantial number of customers.”197
Both the Indianapolis Colts and Baltimore CFL Colts presented experts and surveys in attempts
to prove the likelihood or unlikelihood of confusion between the marks, respectively.198
Ultimately, the Indianapolis Colts prevailed and the Court held that permitting the defendants to
keep their mark would cause confusion among consumers and lead to the Indianapolis Colts
losing business.199
Keeping Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. in mind, it is
seemingly clear that there will be consumer confusion if Nike is permitted to use Leonard’s
“Klaw logo” on their merchandise. Over the course of his NBA career, Leonard has quickly
become one of the most recognizable NBA athletes, and attentive fans of the sport know him for
his incredibly large hands.200 The “Klaw Logo” contains Kawhi’s initials (K.L.), as well as the
basketball number long associated with him, and a depiction of a large hand.201 It can be argued
that anyone who is familiar with basketball would easily recognize this logo as being associated
with NBA superstar Leonard. In fact, because of the uniqueness of both the logo and its relation
to Leonard, the logo really cannot be associated with anyone else. Thus, the Court should be
persuaded to grant Leonard ownership of the trademark for the logo. By allowing Nike to
maintain ownership of the mark and use of it in commerce, consumer confusion would inevitably
result because consumers could only associate it with Leonard.202 A ruling by the Court granting
Leonard ownership of the trademark could restrict Nike from using the mark for sale in
commerce. Despite this possible ruling, Leonard would still not be able to use the logo because
doing so would infringe on Nike’s copyrights. While this seems like a loss, Leonard still owns
the copyright to his original logo because he had personally created that logo before his contract
with Nike. Leonard could modify this original into a derivative work that is distinct enough
from the Nike created “Klaw Design,” thus relieving him from further issues with Nike.
E. Outcome of the Case
On April 22nd, 2020, U.S. District Judge Michael W. Mosman ruled against Leonard’s
claim for ownership of the “Klaw Logo.”203 While an official opinion is yet to be written, Judge
Mosman has revealed his reasoning for denying Leonard’s claim. Judge Mosman held that the
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“Klaw Logo” that Nike created, despite Leonard’s help, is an independent piece of intellectual
property.204 He ruled, “it is not merely a derivative work of the sketch itself …. I do find it to be
new and significantly different from the design.”205 Looking at the logos side by side, one may
find it hard to consider the two “significantly different,” but Judge Mosman believes that the
modifications done to Leonard’s original logo constitutes a brand new original work. Believing
that allowing Leonard’s Complaint to be amended would be futile, Judge Mosman dismissed
Leonard’s claim with prejudice.206 A dismissal with prejudice is a final determination on the
merits of the case, meaning Leonard is forbidden from filing another suit based on the same
grounds.207
While things seem bleak for Leonard, his attorneys are still evaluating all of the options
available to protect Leonard’s interests.208 Leonard likely has two remaining options: (1) appeal
this ruling in hopes that an appellate judge will view the modifications differently, or (2)
abandon the fight and create a brand new logo. Whether Leonard decides to continue this fight
or not may very well depend on how Judge Mosman rules on Nike’s other counterclaims. If
Judge Mosman rules against Leonard on the breach of contract and fraud claims, and, as a result,
awards Nike damages, Leonard may believe it to be worth fighting further.

IV. IMPACT
The outcome of this case reveals a lot about trademark and copyright law and provides
athletes with better information on how to protect their interests in intellectual property. This
case highlights the hurdles that athletes will face when they want to expand their personal brand
beyond that of an endorsement deal. The Court’s denial of the injunction Leonard sought to
prevent Nike from using the “Klaw Logo” on its merchandise, despite the logo’s close
association to Leonard, is a blow to athletes around the world seeking to grow their brands.
After examining the facts of this case and analyzing the relevant laws, one cannot help but feel
that it was the wrong outcome. It is likely that Nike will never use the “Klaw Logo” again. It
appears, having exclusive ownership of the copyright, Nike will either shelf the logo or request
that Leonard pay a large sum of money for permission to use the logo on his products. This
Court’s decision, which allows Nike to essentially force Leonard to buy back the rights for the
use of his logo, will likely leave those paying close attention to this suit dissatisfied. Allowing
Nike to maintain control of the logo in commerce muddies the lines of intellectual property
protection and leaves observers with more questions than answers. Further, a decision like this
seems to go against the basic principles of trademark law by promoting confusion in the
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marketplace.209 This decision highlights deficiencies in our intellectual property law that now
must be addressed.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should not be able to register trademarks in works
that are currently registered as copyrights by other people without the express written consent of
the owner of the registered copyright. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has an examiner
who checks to ensure that the applicant is properly entitled to register the mark, but seemingly
concurrent protections are not included in that search.210 In addition to this, the U.S. Copyright
Officer also erred by granting Leonard registration for copyrights in the same “Klaw Design”
that Nike had already registered.211 By registering Leonard’s copyrights in the logo, the United
States Copyright Officer falsely confirmed Leonard’s belief that he was the true owner of the
“Klaw Logo.” This belief led Leonard to use the logo on his personal merchandise which may
ultimately result in Leonard suffering damages for a breach of contract. Without these necessary
safeguards in place, it is impossible for athletes to truly know if they are infringing on another’s
work while pursuing their own intellectual property gain. These minor changes to the current
system could have prevented Leonard’s dispute from getting this far and saved the large amounts
of money and judicial resources that were spent resolving the case. If change does not occur,
athletes will never truly know that their intellectual property is protected, and many may find
themselves similarly situated as Leonard – clawing for protection.
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